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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we propose the first identity-based broad-
cast encryption scheme, which can simultaneously achieves
confidentiality and full anonymity against adaptive chosen-
ciphertext attacks under a standard assumption. In addi-
tion, two further desirable features are also provided: one is
fully-collusion resistant which means that even if all users
outside of receivers S collude they cannot obtain any infor-
mation about the plaintext. The other one is stateless which
means that the users in the system do not need to update
their private keys when the other users join or leave the sys-
tem. In particular, our scheme is highly efficient, where the
public parameters size, the private key size and the decryp-
tion cost are all independent to the number of the receivers.
Keywords
anonymous; identity-based broadcast encryption; adaptive
chosen-ciphertext security; weakly robust; random oracle
model
1. INTRODUCTION
Broadcast encryption (BE) was first introduced by Fiat
and Naor [17]. In a BE system, a sender encrypts a message
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to a set of receivers S over an insecure channel, only the
users in the set S can decrypt, while the other users outside
of S cannot decrypt. In particular, BE can save computa-
tional cost and communication load relatively to repeated-
ly utilize point-to-point traditional encryption. Thus, BE
brings many practical applications, such as encrypted file
sharing [25], satellite TV subscription services [13], digital
right management [24], social network service [19].
Chosen-ciphertext security [27, 28, 5, 15] is a desirable
security notion for public key encryption (PKE) schemes,
where there exists some active attackers who may potential-
ly modify the transmissive messages. It is a more stronger
security notion than a chosen-plaintext security where the
attacker can only obtain the ciphertexts for arbitrary plain-
texts. A public-key BE [14] (hereinafter referred to as BE)
is a specific type of PKE, in which any sender can create
a ciphertext by using the public keys of receivers S. Spe-
cially, it is preferable security if the BE system is not only
chosen-ciphertext security, but also fully collusion-resistance
security [7], which captures the intuition that even if all user-
s outside of S collude, they cannot obtain any information
about the plaintext. In the aspect of function, stateless re-
ceivers is a desirable property for BE system [14, 26], where
the users in the system do not (necessarily) update their pri-
vate keys when the other users join or leave. In 2005, Boneh,
Gentry, and Waters [6] proposed the first stateless and fully-
collusion resistant BE scheme with chosen-ciphertext secu-
rity. However, it was proven to be secure in the selective
security model under q-type assumptions. The selective se-
curity requires an adversary to declare the attacked targets
before it obtains the public parameters. Until 2009, Gen-
try and Waters [18] proposed a BE scheme with adaptive
secure without random oracle. The adaptive secure allows
an adversary to declare the attacked targets after it receives
the public parameters. That is selective security model is
weaker security model than adaptive security model.
http //dx.doi.org/10.1145/2897845.2897879
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Anonymity is another security requirement for encryption
schemes, it means that anyone cannot obtain the identities
of receivers from the ciphertexts. For example: when a cus-
tomer orders some sensitive TV programs, the customer usu-
ally does not expect any other customers know him subscribe
programs. In particular, the issue has received more and
more attention in various fields of cryptography so far, such
as key-privacy public key encryption scheme [4], anonymous
identity-based encryption schemes [1, 9, 10], attribute-based
encryption with hidden policy scheme [22], predicate encryp-
tion with hidden-vector scheme [20]. In particular, in 2006,
Barth, Boneh and Waters [3] presented two fully anonymous
BE constructions with chosen-ciphertext security. One is a
generic construction, which is based on a chosen-ciphertext
secure anonymous PKE schemes in standard model, but the
decryption cost is linear with the number of receivers, and
the other one is an improved construction which requires a
constant number of decryption operations, whereas the secu-
rity proof relies on the random oracle model. In 2012, Libert,
Paterson and Quaglia [23] also presented some fully anony-
mous BE constructions with adaptive chosen-ciphertext se-
curity in the standard model and gave a formal security
definition for anonymous BE schemes. At the same year,
Fazio and Perera [16] proposed two outsider-anonymous BE
constructions with sublinear ciphertexts and have proven
their constructions against adaptive chosen-plaintext attack
(CPA) and adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA) in s-
tandard model, respectively.
Identity-based broadcast encryption (IBBE) is a specific
case of broadcast encryption [30], in which the users’ public
key can be an arbitrary string provided that the string can
uniquely identify the user, such as passport number, email
address. It has been drawn more and more attentions. In
2005, Baek, Safavi-Naini and Susilo [2] proposed the first
efficient multi-receiver IBE scheme, which is a selectively
CCA-secure in random oracle model. It is noteworthy that
any multi-receiver IBE scheme can be transformed into a
identity-based BE (IBBE) scheme. In 2007, Delerablee [12]
proposed the first IBBE scheme with constant size cipher-
texts and private keys, and it is also selectively CCA-secure
in random oracle model. In 2009, Gentry and Waters [18]
presented the first adaptively CPA-secure IBBE scheme in s-
tandard model. In 2014, Boneh and Waters [8] gave the first
selectively CCA-secure IBBE from multilinear maps with
constant size ciphertexts. In 2015, Kim, Susilo, Au and Se-
berry presented an adaptively CCA-secure IBBE scheme [21]
in standard model through employing dual system encryp-
tion technique. However, all of these schemes cannot obtain
anonymity. As the receivers’ identities are transmitted as a
part of the ciphertext. It completely leaks the identities of
receivers.
In order to issue this problem, in the literature, there ex-
ists some anonymous IBBE schemes. Here we discuss some
of the state-of-the-art ones. In 2013, Zhang and Takagi [34]
proposed two fully anonymous multi-receiver IBE schemes
with adaptive CCA security in the random oracle. How-
ever, insider-anonymous in their first scheme was attacked
by Zhang and Mao [32] and the security proof for their sec-
ond scheme was not provided. Additionally, Zhang and Mao
[32] gave a new anonymous multi-receiver IBBE scheme, and
they declared that their scheme can obtain CCA security.
However, we found that there exists a flaw in their proof,
that is they confused the hash function with the hash ora-
cle. At the same year, Zhang, Wu and Mu [33] presented
a fully anonymous IBBE schemes with adaptive CPA secu-
rity in a composite group. In 2014, Ren, Niu and Zhang
[29] proposed a fully anonymous IBBE scheme with adap-
tive CPA security in standard model. At the same year, Xie
and Ren [31] proposed an outsider-anonymous IBBE with
adaptive CPA security in standard model. However, none
of these schemes can achieve confidentiality and anonymity
simultaneously with adaptive CCA security.
Our Contributions To address the challenge mentioned
above, in this paper, we propose a secure anonymous IBBE
scheme under a standard (DBDH) assumption. Firstly, our
scheme is the first IBBE scheme that can simultaneously
satisfy confidentiality and anonymity with adaptive CCA
security. Secondly, our scheme has some desirable features
which are fully collusion resistant and stateless. Thirdly,
our scheme is highly efficient, and it has constant public
parameters size, private key size and decryption time. Fi-
nally, we define a new security notion for IBBE scheme
which is named weakly robust under chosen-ciphertext at-
tacks (WROB-CCA).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion 2, we review some fundamental backgrounds necessary
to understand our paper, which includes Bilinear Groups,
DBDH assumption and Target Collision Resistant (TCR)
hash function. Next, we give the formal definition and secu-
rity notions of IBBE scheme in Section 3. In Section 4, we
present our anonymous IBBE scheme and prove its security.
In Section 5, we compare the performance and the simula-
tion results between our scheme and the other schemes (BE
schemes and IBBE schemes). Finally, we draw conclusions
in Section 6.
2. PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Bilinear Groups
We briefly review the concept of Bilinear groups which is
the underlying algebraic structure of many IBBE including
ours. G is an algorithm, which takes as input a security
parameter λ and outputs a tuple (p,G,GT , e), where G and
GT are multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p, and
e : G × G → GT is a map, which has the following proper-
ties: Bilinearity: e(ua, vb) = e(u, v)ab for all u, v ∈ G and
∀a, b ∈ Zp. Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) 6= 1G, where g is a
generator of G. Computability: There exists an efficient
algorithm to compute e(u, v) for ∀u, v ∈ G.
2.2 Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (DBDH)
Assumption
The decisional BDH problem in a bilinear group (p, G, GT ,
e) is as follows: Given a tuple (g, ga, gb, gc, Z) for a, b, c←R
Zp as input, output 1 if Z = e(g, g)abc and 0 otherwise.
For a probabilistic algorithm A, we define its advantage in
solving the DBDH problem as:
AdvDBDHA =|Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)abc) = 1]
− Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gc, Z) = 1]|
where g is a random generator in G and Z ←R GT .
We say that the decisional BDH assumption holds in the
bilinear map (p,G,GT , e) if all probabilistic polynomial-time
(PPT) algorithms have a negligible advantage in solving the
DBDH problem.
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2.3 Target Collision Resistant hash function
In a TCR hash function family H, choose a hash function
H ∈R H and a random value x from the definition domain
of the hash function H. For any PPT adversary A, it is
infeasible to succeed in finding a collision such that H(y) =
H(x) with y 6= x.
Informally, we define A’s advantage in attacking the tar-
get collision resistance of hash function H as AdvTCRH,A = Pr
[A succeeds in finding collisions]. For any PPT adversary A
and any hash function H ∈R H, if the advantage function
AdvTCRH,A is negligible, we say the TCR hash function family
H is a target collision resistant.
3. IDENTITY-BASED BROADCAST ENCRYP-
TION
We present the definition and security notions for IBBE
scheme in the following [12, 23].
Definition 1. An identity-based broadcast encryption scheme,
associated with message space M, consists of a tuple of four
algorithms (Setup, Extract, Encrypt, Decrypt):
• Setup(1λ): On input a security parameter λ, output
the public parameters params and a master secret key
msk.
• Extract(msk, ID): On input a master secret key msk
and an identity ID, output a private key skID for the
identity ID.
• Encrypt(params, S,M): On input the public param-
eters params, a receiver set S and a message M ∈M,
output a ciphertext CT .
• Decrypt(params, skID, CT ): On input the public pa-
rameters params, a private key skID and a ciphertext
CT , output either a message M or the error symbol
⊥.
The correctness property requires that, for all ID ∈ S, if
(params, msk) ← Setup (1λ), skID ← Extract (msk, ID)
and CT ← Encrypt (params, S, M), then Decrypt (params,
skID, CT ) = M with overwhelming probability.
Remark: Identity-based encryption is a special case of
identity-based broadcast encryption, when the size of the
receiver set is only one.
Next, we shall define the security notions for IBBE scheme.
First, we review the notion of indistinguishability under
chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA), which means that
the ciphertext does not leak any information of the mes-
sage. Then, we review the security notion of anonymity
under chosen-ciphertext attacks (ANO-CCA), which means
that the ciphertext does not leak the identities in the receiv-
er set. Last, we define a new security notion named weakly
robust against chosen-ciphertext attacks (WROB-CCA). It
guarantees that decryption attempts fail with high proba-
bility if the ”wrong” private key is used.
We define the IND-CCA security game for IBBE as fol-
lows. Let A be a PPT adversary, A interacts with challenger
C in the following games.
The IND-CCA Game:
• Setup: Challenger C runs (params, msk)← Setup(1λ),
and then sends params to adversary A and keeps the
master secret key msk itself.
• Phase 1: Adversary A adaptively issues the following
queries:
– Extraction Query: On input an identity ID, chal-
lenger C returns skID ← Extract(msk, ID) to ad-
versary A.
– Decryption Query: On input an identity ID and a
ciphertext CT , challenger C returns m← Decrypt
(params, skID, CT ) to adversary A, where skID
← Extract(msk, ID).
• Challenge: Adversary A submits two distinct equal-
length messages M0, M1 ∈ M and a receiver set S∗
to challenger C. It is required that A has not issued
Extraction Query on ID ∈ S∗. Challenger C flips a
random coin β ∈ {0, 1} and returns the challenge ci-
phertext CT ∗ ← Encrypt (params, S∗, Mβ) to adver-
sary A.
• Phase 2: Adversary A continues to adaptively issue
queries as in Phase 1 subject to the following restric-
tions: (i) A cannot issue Extraction Query on ID,
where ID ∈ S∗; (ii) A cannot issue Decryption Query
on (ID,C∗), where ID ∈ S∗.
• Guess: Adversary A outputs a guess β′ ∈ {0, 1}.
Definition 2. We define adversary A’s advantage in IND-
CCA Game as AdvIND-CCAA,IBBE = |Pr [β′ = β] −1/2|. We say
that an IBBE scheme is IND-CCA secure, if for any PP-
T adversary A, the advantage AdvIND-CCAA,IBBE is negligible in
IND-CCA Game.
We define the ANO-CCA security game for IBBE as fol-
lows.
The ANO-CCA Game:
• Setup: It is the same as in the IND-CCA Game.
• Phase 1: It is the same as in the IND-CCA Game.
• Challenge: A submits a message M∗ and two distinct
sets S0, S1 to C. It is required that |S0| = |S1| and
A has not issued Extraction Query on ID ∈ S04S1,
where S04S1 denotes S0∪S1−S0∩S1. C flips a random
coin β ∈ {0, 1} and returns the challenge ciphertext
CT ∗←Encrypt(params, Sβ ,M∗) to A.
• Phase 2: A continues to adaptively issue queries as in
Phase 1 with the restrictions as follows: (i) A cannot
issue Extraction Query on ID, where ID ∈ S04S1; (ii)
A cannot issue Decryption Query on (ID,C∗), where
ID ∈ S04S1.
• Guess: A outputs a guess β′ ∈ {0, 1}.
Definition 3. We define adversary A’s advantage in the
above ANO-CCA Game as AdvANO-CCAA,IBBE = |Pr[β′ = β] −
1/2|. We say that an IBBE scheme is ANO-CCA secure,
if for any PPT adversary A, the advantage AdvANO-CCAA,IBBE is
negligible in the above ANO-CCA Game.
Remark: Note that the definition captures not only out-
sider attacks but also insider attacks. In other words, even
when an identity ID ∈ S0 ∩ S1 is corrupted, the anonymity
of any non-corrupted ID ∈ S04S1 is still preserved.
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We define the WROB-CCA security game for IBBE as fol-
lows.
The WROB-CCA Game:
• Setup: It is the same as in the IND-CCA Game.
• Query Phase: It is the same as Phase 1 in the IND-
CCA Game.
• Output: Adversary A outputs a message M , a re-
ceiver set S∗ = {ID1, ID2, · · · , IDt}, where |S∗| =
t. C outputs the challenge ciphertext CT ∗← Encrypt
(params, S∗, M).
We say that A wins the WROB-CCA Game if Decrypt
(params, skID∗ , CT
∗) 6= ⊥, where ID∗ 6∈ S∗ and skID∗
= Extract (msk, ID∗). It is required that A has not issued
Extraction Query on ID∗ in Query Phase.
We define adversary A’s advantage as the probability of
that A wins.
Definition 4. We say that an IBBE scheme is WROB-
CCA secure, if for all PPT adversaries A, the advantage of
winning the above WROB-CCA Game is negligible.
Remark: The above security notions of IND-CCA, ANO-
CCA and WROB-CCA can be naturally defined for an identity-
based encryption (IBE) scheme by limiting the size of the
receiver set to be only one.
4. AN EFFICIENT ANONYMOUS IBBE CON-
STRUCTION
In this section, we present a highly efficient anonymous
IBBE construction. Hereon, we simply introduce some no-
tations throughout this construction. For two strings x, y,
let [x]` denote the first ` bits of x, [x]
` denote the last ` bits
of x, and x||y denote that x connects with y.
4.1 Construction
• Setup(1λ): On input a security parameter λ, it first
generates a bilinear group (p,G,GT , e), where p is a
λ-bit prime, G and GT are two cyclic groups with
prime order p, e is a bilinear map e : G × G → GT ,
and then it picks generators g, u, v, w ∈R G, chooses
α ∈R Zp as a master secret key, computes g1 = gα, and
chooses cryptographic hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ →
G, H2 : GT → Zp, H3 : Zp × G → {0, 1}l and a tar-
get collision-resistant hash function H4 : G×{0, 1}` ×
Zpt → Zp. The public parameters are params =
(p,G,GT , e, g, g1, u, v, w,H1, H2, H3,H4) and the mas-
ter secret key is msk = α.
• Extract(msk, ID): On input master secret key msk
and identity ID ∈ {0, 1}∗, it first computes QID =
H1(ID), and then outputs the private key skID = Q
α
ID
for identity ID.
• Encrypt(params, S,m): On input public parameter-
s params, receiver set S = {ID1, ID2, · · · , IDt} and
message m ∈ {0, 1}`1 , it picks r, k, τ ∈R Zp and com-
putes C0 = g
r. For each IDi ∈ S, it sets VIDi=H2(e(
QIDi , g1)
r), f(x)=
∏t
i=1(x − VIDi) + k=
∑t−1
j=0 ajx
j +
xt (mod p), which aj is the coefficient correspond to
xj . C1 = [H3(k||C0)]`−`1 ||([H3(k||C0)]`1 ⊕ m), h =
H4(C0, C1, a0, · · · , at−1), C2 = (uhvτw)r. The cipher-
text is CT = (τ, C0, C1, C2, a0, a1, · · · , at−1).
• Decrypt(params, skID, CT ): On input public param-
eters params, private key skID and ciphertext CT =
(τ, C0, C1, C2, a0, a1, · · · , at−1), it computes h=H4(C0,
C1, a0 ,a1, · · · , at−1), and then checks whether e(C0,
uhvτw) = e(g, C2) holds. If not, it outputs ⊥. Oth-
erwise, it computes VID = H2(e(skID, C0)) and k =
f(VID) =
∑t−1
j=0 aj(VID)
j + VID
t (mod p). If [C1]`−`1
6= [H3(k||C0)]`−`1 , it outputs ⊥. Otherwise, it outputs
m=[H3(k || C0)]`1 ⊕ [C1]`1 .
4.2 Security Analysis
We shall prove that the above IBBE construction is WROB-
CCA secure, IND-CCA secure and ANO-CCA seucre.
First, we shall prove the IBBE construction is WROB-
CCA security. As the property of WROB-CCA security is
needed when we prove the above construction to be IND-
CCA security and ANO-CCA security.
The following theorem states the above IBBE construction
is WROB-CCA security.
Theorem 1. Suppose H1, H2, H3 are random oracles, then
the above IBBE construction is WROB-CCA secure.
Proof. Suppose there exists a WROB-CCA adversary
A against the above IBBE construction, it is easy to con-
struct a PPT algorithm B that makes use of A to break the
randomness of H1, H2, H3 oracles’s outputs. B runs A as
follows.
• Setup. B chooses bilinear groups (p,G,GT , e) of prime
order p, picks generators g, u, v, w ∈R G, chooses α ∈R
Zp as the master secret key, and sets g1 = gα. A is
given the public parameters params = (p, G, GT , e,
g, g1, u, v, w, H1, H2, H3, H4), where H1, H2, H3 are
random oracles controlled by B and H4 is collision-
resistant hash function. B keeps the master private
key α itself.
• Query Phase. A adaptively issues queries as follows:
– Hash1 Query : On input ID, B does the following:
If there exists a record 〈ID,Q, q〉 in the H1-list,
which the list is initialized empty, it returns Q;
else it selects q ∈R Zp, computes Q = gq ∈ G,
and adds 〈ID,Q, q〉 into the H1-list, it returns Q
to A.
– Hash2 Query : On input X, B does the following:
If there exists a record 〈X, v〉 in the H2-list, which
the list is initialized empty, it returns v to A; else,
it selects v ∈R Z∗q , adds 〈X, v〉 into the H2-list,
returns v to A.
– Hash3 Query : On input 〈k, C0〉, B does the fol-
lowing: If there exists a record 〈k, C0,K〉 in the
H3-list, which the list is initialized empty, it re-
turns K; else, it selects K ∈R {0, 1}`, and adds
〈k, C0,K〉 into H3-list, it returns K to A.
– Extraction Query : On input ID, B first queries
Hash1 Query on ID, suppose that 〈ID,Q, q〉 be
the corresponding tuple in the H1-list. Then B
computes skID = Q
α = gαq and sends skID to
A.
– Decryption Query : A inputs 〈ID,CT 〉, B can use
master private key α to answer any Decryption
Query to A.
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• Output. A outputs message M ∈ {0, 1}`1 and re-
ceiver set S∗ = (ID∗1 , ID
∗
2 , · · · , ID∗t ), where |S∗| = t.
B runs CT←Encrypt(params, S∗,M) as follows: Pick
r, k∗, τ∗ ∈R Zp, for all ID∗i ∈ S∗, compute C∗0 = gr,
V ∗ID∗i =H2(e(g1, H1(ID
∗
i ))
r), f(x) =
∏t
i=1(x−V ∗ID∗i )+
k∗ =
∑t−1
j=0 a
∗
jx
j +xt (mod p), output {a∗0, · · · , a∗t−1},
which a∗j is the coefficient correspond to x
j . C∗1 =
[H3(k
∗||C∗0 )]`−`1 ||([H3(k∗||C∗0 )]`1 ⊕M), h∗ = H4(C∗0 ,
C∗1 , a
∗
0, · · · , a∗t−1), C∗2 = (uh
∗
vτ
∗
w)r. The challenge
ciphertext: CT ∗ = (τ∗, C∗0 , C
∗
1 , C
∗
2 , a
∗
0, a
∗
1, · · · , a∗t−1).
If Decrypt(params, skID∗ , CT
∗) 6=⊥, where ID∗ 6∈ S∗
and skID∗ ← Extract(msk, ID∗). It is required that
A has not issued Extraction Query on ID∗ in Query
Phase. Then A wins.
Analysis: If A wins the WROB-CCA game, then there
exists someM ′ 6=⊥, such that Decrypt(params, skID∗ , CT ∗)
= M ′ and ID∗ 6∈ S∗, it implies that there exists a k′, such
that C∗1 = [H3(k
′||C∗0 )]`−`1 ||([H3(k′||C∗0 )]`1 ⊕ M ′), where
k′ = f(V ′ID∗), V
′
ID∗ = H2(e(skID∗ , C
∗
0 )). However, for
ID∗i ∈ S, C∗1 = [H3(k∗||C∗0 )]`−`1 ||([H3(k∗||C∗0 )]`1 ⊕ M),
where k∗ = f(V ∗ID∗i ), V
∗
ID∗i
= H2(e(skID∗i , C
∗
0 )).
However, the advantage of A winning the game is negligi-
ble.
1. If k′ = k∗, namely f(V ′ID∗) = f(V
∗
ID∗i
), since f(x)
=
∏t
i=1(x − V ∗ID∗i ) + k
∗ for ID∗i ∈ S∗, then we get∏t
i=1(V
′
ID∗ − V ∗ID∗i ) = 0. It means that these exists
some V ∗ID∗i , such that V
′
ID∗ = V
∗
ID∗i
, that is H2(X
′
ID∗)
= H2(X
∗
ID∗i
). As H2 is a random oracle, so X
′
ID∗
= X∗ID∗i . As X
′
ID∗ = e(H1(ID
∗), g1)r and X∗ID∗i =
e(H1(ID
∗
i ),g1)
r, it implies H1(ID
∗) = H1(ID∗i ), As
H1 is a random oracle, then ID
∗ = ID∗i , but it is
contradictory with ID∗ 6∈ S∗. So we know k′ = k∗ is
not correct.
2. If k′ 6= k∗, as H3 is a random oracle, then [H3(k′ ||
C∗0 )]`−`1 6= [H3(k∗||C∗0 )]`−`1 . However, [H3(k∗||C∗0 )]`−`1
= [C∗1 ]`−`1 , then [H3(k
′||C∗0 )]`−`1 6= [C∗1 ]`−`1 .
So A can only get ⊥, it is contradictory with M ′ 6=⊥. So
the advantage of A winning the game is negligible.
Next, we shall prove the above IBBE construction is IND-
CCA security.
Theorem 2. Suppose that H1, H2, H3 are random ora-
cles, the above IBBE construction is WROB-CCA secure
and the DBDH assumption holds, then the above IBBE con-
struction is IND-CCA secure.
Proof. Suppose there exists an IND-CCA adversary A
against the above IBBE scheme. It is easy to construct a
PPT algorithm B that makes use of A to solve the DBDH
problem or break the IBBE construction’s WROB-CCA se-
curity. Algorithm B is given a random tuple (g, ga, gb, gc, Z),
that is either sampled from PBDH (where Z = e(g, g)abc) or
from RBDH (where Z is uniform and independent in GT ).
B runs A to execute the following steps.
• Setup. B sets g1 = ga, u = gbx1gx2 , v = gby1gy2 , w =
gbz1gz2 , where x1, x2, y1, y2, z1, z2 ∈R Zp, A is given
the public parameters params = (p, G, GT , g, g1, u,
v, w, H1, H2, H3, H4), where H1, H2, H3 are ran-
dom oracles controlled by B and H4 is target collision-
resistant hash function. The master secret key a is
unknown to B.
• Phase 1. A adaptively issues queries as follows:
– Hash1 Query : On input ID, B does the following:
If there exists a record 〈ID,Q, q,$〉 in H1-list,
which the list is initially empty, it returns Q; else
it generates $ ∈R {0, 1} and selects q ∈R Zp.
If $ = 0, it computes Q = gq; else it computes
Q = gbq and adds 〈ID,Q, q,$〉 into H1-list. It
returns Q to A.
– Hash2 Query : It is the same as the above WROB-
CCA game.
– Hash3 Query : It is the same as the above WROB-
CCA game.
– Extraction Query : On input ID, B first issues
Hash1 Query on ID to obtain 〈ID,Q, q,$〉, if
$ = 1, B outputs ⊥ and aborts; else it computes
skID = g
q
1 and returns skID to A. (Note that
skID = g
q
1 = g
aq = Qa = H1(ID)
α, so this is a
proper private key for ID).
– Decryption Query : On input 〈ID,CT 〉, where
CT = (τ, C0, C1, C2, a0, a1, · · · , at−1), B first is-
sues Hash1 Query on ID to obtain 〈ID,Q, q,$〉,
if $ = 0, it computes skID = g
q
1 , and then uses
this private key to respond the Decryption Query ;
else it does as follows: compute h = H4(C0, C1,
a0, a1, · · · , at−1) and check whether e(C0, uhvτw)
= e(g, C2) holds. If not, output ⊥, which in-
dicates an invalid ciphertext; else check whether
x1h + y1τ + z1 = 0 holds. If so, abort and ran-
domly output a bit; else continue to execute the
rest steps: As C2 = (u
hvτw)r = (gb(x1h+y1τ+z1))r
(g(x2h+y2τ+z2))r = C
b(x1h+y1τ+z1)
0 C
(x2h+y2τ+z2)
0 ,
and compute Cb0 = (
C2
C
(x2h+y2τ+z2)
0
)
1
(x1h+y1τ+z1) .
So XID = e(QID, g1)
r = e(gbq, g1)
r = e(Cb0, g1)
q.
B issues Hash2 Query on XID to get VID, where
VID = H2(XID), and computes k = f(VID) =∑t−1
i=0 ai(VID)
i + (VID)
t, and then issues Hash3
Query on 〈k, C0〉 to get K, where K = H3(k||C0).
If [C1]`−`1 6= [K]`−`1 , it outputs ⊥ which indi-
cates an invalid ciphertext; else it outputs m =
[K]`1 ⊕ [C1]`1 .
Recall that, the public parameters u = gbx1gx2 ,
v = gby1gy2 , w = gbz1gz2 for random x1, x2, y1,
y2, z1, z2 ∈ Z∗q , x1, (y1, z1. resp.) is blinded by x2,
(y2, z2. resp.), and hence no information about x1,
y1 and z1 is leaked to A, and the equality x1h+
y1τ + z1 = 0 (mod p) information-theoretically
holds with probability at most 1
p
.
• Challenge. A outputs two distinct equal-length mes-
sages M0, M1 and a receiver set S
∗. It required that A
has not issued Extraction Query on any ID, where ID
∈ S∗ in Phase 1. For all IDi ∈ S∗, B first issues Hash1
Query on IDi to obtain (IDi, QIDi , qi, $i). If there
exists some IDi ∈ S∗ and $i = 0, B aborts; else for
each IDi ∈ S∗, B lets X∗IDi = Zqi and issues Hash2
Query on X∗IDi to obtain V
∗
IDi
from H2-list, where
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V ∗IDi = H2(X
∗
IDi
). Next, B randomly chooses k∗ ∈ Zp,
computes f(x) =
∏t
i=1(x−V ∗IDi)+k∗ =
∑t−1
i=0 a
∗
i x
i+xt
(mod p) and outputs (a∗0, a
∗
1, · · · , a∗t−1). Let C∗0 =
gc, B issues Hash3 Query on (k∗, C∗0 ) to obtain K∗,
where K∗ = H3(k∗||C∗0 ), B randomly chooses β ∈
{0, 1}, computes C∗1 = [K∗]`−`1 || ([K∗]`1 ⊕ Mβ), h∗
= H4(C
∗
0 , C
∗
1 , a
∗
0, · · · , a∗t−1), defines τ∗ = −x1h
∗+z1
y1
∈ Zp and compute C∗2 = (gc)x2h
∗+y2τ∗+z2 . Last, B
outputs the challenge ciphertext: CT ∗ =(τ∗, C∗0 , C
∗
1 ,
C∗2 , a
∗
0, a
∗
1, · · · , a∗t−1).
• Phase 2. A continues to adaptively issue queries as
following:
– Extraction Query : A inputs ID, where ID 6∈ S∗,
B handles them as in Phase 1.
– Decryption Query : A inputs 〈ID,CT 〉, where CT
= (τ , C0, C1, C2, a0, a1, · · · , at−1).
∗ If CT 6= CT ∗, B checks if H4(C0, C1, a0,
· · · , at−1) = H4(C∗0 , C∗1 , a∗0, · · · , a∗t−1). If
so, B aborts and randomly outputs a bit; else
responds as in Phase 1. (Note that, A can
produce such a ciphertext, this would imply
a collision in the hash function H4, but the
probability that this event occurs is negligi-
ble).
∗ If CT = CT ∗ and ID ∈ S∗, B outputs ⊥.
∗ If CT = CT ∗ and ID 6∈ S∗, B outputs ⊥
with non-negligible advantage. As the IBBE
scheme is WROB-CCA secure, CT ∗ ← En-
crypt (params, S∗, Mβ) and Decrypt (params,
skID, CT
∗) 6= ⊥ is negligible for ID 6∈ S∗.
• Guess. A outputs a bit b′.
If b′ = b then B outputs 1 meaning Z = e(g, g)abc; else
it outputs 0 meaning Z 6= e(g, g)abc.
Ananysis: When Z = e(g, g)abc, assume r∗ = c, challenge
ciphertext issued by A comes from a distribution identical
to that in the actual construction; When Z is uniform and
independent in GT , the ciphtertext C
∗
1 = [K
∗]`−`1 || ([K∗]`1
⊕ Mβ), where K∗ = H3(k∗||C∗0 ) is uniform and random, so
Mβ is independent of the adversary A’s view.
Finally, we shall prove the above IBBE construction is
ANO-CCA secure.
Theorem 3. Suppose that H1, H2, H3 are random ora-
cles and DBDH assumption holds, then the above IBBE
construction is ANO-CCA secure.
Proof. Suppose that there exists an ANO-CCA adver-
sary A against the above IBBE construction. It is easy
to construct a PPT algorithm B makes use of A to solve
the DBDH problem. B is given as input a random tuple
(g, ga, gb, gc, Z), that is either sampled from PBDH (where
Z = e(g, g)abc) or from RBDH (where Z is uniform and
independent in GT ). Algorithm B’s goal is to output 1 if
Z = e(g, g)abc and 0 otherwise. B runs A as follows.
• Setup. It is the same as in the Setup of Theorem 2.
• Phase 1. It is the same as in the Phase 1 of Theorem
2.
• Challenge. A outputs a message M ∈ {0, 1}`1 and
two distinct receiver sets S∗0 , S
∗
1 , where there is at least
one different user in the two sets. There is no loss gen-
erality, assuming that S∗0 = {ID∗0 , ID2, · · · , IDt} and
S∗1 = {ID∗1 , ID2, · · · , IDt}. It required that A has
not issued Extraction Query on ID such that ID ∈
{ID∗0 , ID∗1} in Phase 1. Then, B responds as follows:
Let C∗0 = g
c, choose a random bit β ∈ {0, 1}, where
S∗β = {ID∗β , ID2, · · · , IDt}. Issue Hash1 Query on
ID∗β to obtain (ID
∗
β , Q
∗
β , qβ , $β), if $β = 0, out-
put ⊥ and abort; else QID∗
β
= gbqβ and X∗ID∗
β
= Zqβ ,
and then issue Hash2 Query on X
∗
ID∗
β
to get V ∗ID∗
β
,
where V ∗ID∗
β
= H2(X
∗
ID∗
β
). For the other identities IDi
∈ S∗β \ ID∗β , first issue Hash1 Query on IDi to obtain
(IDi, Qi, qi, $i), if there exists some $i = 1, output
⊥ and abort; else compute QIDi = gqi and X∗IDi =
e(gcqi , ga). Then, issues Hash2 Query on X
∗
IDi
to get
V ∗IDi , where V
∗
IDi
= H2(X
∗
IDi
). Next, choose k∗ ∈R
Zp, compute f(x) = (x−V ∗ID∗
β
)
∏t
i=2(x−V ∗IDi)+k∗ =∑t−1
i=0 a
∗
i x
i+xt (mod p), output (a∗0, a
∗
1, · · · , a∗t−1) and
issue Hash3 Query on 〈k∗, C∗0 〉 to get K∗, where K∗ =
H3(k
∗||C∗0 ). Last, compute C∗1 = [K∗]`−`1 ||([K∗]`1 ⊕
M), h∗ = H4(C∗0 , C
∗
1 , a
∗
0, · · · , a∗t−1), set τ∗ = −x1h
∗+z1
y1
and C∗2 = (g
c)x2h
∗+y2τ∗+z2 . Output the challenge ci-
phertext: CT ∗ = (τ∗, C∗0 , C
∗
1 , C
∗
2 , a
∗
0, a
∗
1, · · · , a∗t−1).
• Phase 2. A continues to adaptively issue queries as
follows:
– Extraction Query : A issues Extraction Query on
ID such that ID 6∈ {ID∗0 , ID∗1}, B handles them
as in Phase 1.
– Decryption Query : A inputs 〈ID,CT 〉, where CT =
(τ , C0, C1, C2, a0, a1, · · · , at−1), B performs the
following steps:
∗ If CT 6= CT ∗, B checks if H4(C0, C1, a0,
· · · , at−1)=H4(C∗0 , C∗1 , a∗0, · · · , a∗t−1). If so,
it aborts, and randomly outputs a bit; else
responds as in Phase 1. (Note that A can
produce such a ciphertext, this would repre-
sent a target collision in the hash functionH4,
and so the probability that this event occurs
is negligible).
∗ If CT = CT ∗, for ID ∈ {ID∗0 , ID∗1}, B out-
puts ⊥. For ID ∈ S∗0 ∩ S∗1 , B outputs M .
For ID 6∈ S∗0 ∪ S∗1 , B outputs ⊥ with non-
negligible advantage. As the IBBE scheme
is WROB-CCA security. That is CT ∗ ← En-
crypt (params, S∗β , M), and Decrypt(params,
skID, CT
∗) 6=⊥ is negligible, for ID 6∈ S∗0 ∪ S∗1 .
• Guess. A outputs a bit b′.
If b′ = b then B outputs 1 meaning Z = e(g, g)abc;
otherwise, it outputs 0 meaning Z 6= e(g, g)abc.
Ananysis: When Z = e(g, g)abc, assume r∗ = c, challenge
ciphertext issued by A comes from a distribution identical
to that in the actual construction; When Z is uniform and
independent inGT , the ciphtertext C
∗
1 = [K
∗]`−`1 ||([K∗]`1⊕
Mβ), where K
∗ = H3(k∗||C∗0 ) is uniform and random, so Mβ
is independent of the adversary A’s view.
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Table 1: Performance Comparisons between IBBE schemes and ours
PPs Size Sk Size CT Size Dec Time Security Model Order Assumption Random Oracle Stateless Anonymous
[2] O(1) O(1) O(k) O(1) sID-CCA Prime Gap-BDH X X ×
[12] O(`) O(1) O(1) O(k) sID-CPA Prime GDDHE X × ×
[18] O(`) O(1) O(√`) O(√`) ID-CPA Prime q-type × X ×
[8] O(log `) O(1) O(1) O(k) sID-CPA Prime l-BDHE × × ×
[21] O(`) O(`) O(1) O(k) ID-CCA Composite GSD × X ×
Ours O(1) O(1) O(k) O(1) ID-CCA Prime DBDH X X X
Table 2: Performance Comparisons between Anonymous BE schemes and ours
Anonymity Security Model Pk Size Sk Size CT Size Decryption time Random Oracle Identity-based
[3] Fully sID-CCA O(`) O(1) O(k) O(1) X ×
[23] Fully ID-CCA O(`) O(1) O(k) O(1) × ×
[16] Outsider ID-CCA O(` log `) O(`) O(r) O(1) × ×
[34] Outsider ID-CCA O(1) O(1) O(k) O(k) X X
[29] Fully ID-CPA O(n) O(1) O(k) O(1) × X
[33] fully ID-CPA O(`) O(k) O(1) O(1) × X
[31] Outsider ID-CPA O(`) O(k) O(1) O(1) × X
Ours Fully ID-CCA O(1) O(1) O(k) O(1) X X
5. PERFORMANCE ANALYSES
In this section, we first compare our scheme with the oth-
er IBBE schemes proposed in the literature [2, 12, 18, 8,
21]. The comparisons are summarized in Table 1. Then, we
compare our scheme with the other anonymous BE schemes
proposed in the literature [3, 23, 16, 34, 33, 29, 31]. The
comparisons are summarized in Table 2. Finally, we com-
pare the running time of encryption and decryption between
ours and the scheme [34] which achieves low computation
cost and light communication load. It is depicted in Figure
1.
Now, let us explain some notations used in Table 1 and
Table 2. Here “`” denotes the total number of the system
users. “k” denotes the number of receivers. “r” denotes the
number of revocation users. “n” denotes the bit length of
an identity. “sID” and “ID” denote selective security and
adaptive security, respectively.
From Table 1, it’s not hard to see that only our scheme
is anonymous. The public parameters size, private key size
and decryption time are constant just in the scheme [2] and
ours. However, the scheme [2] achieves only selective secu-
rity which is weaker than adaptive security. Although the
ciphertext size of ours is linear with the number of receivers
and the ciphertext size of schemes [12, 8, 21] are constant,
but in those schemes [12, 8, 21] the public parameter size are
related with the total number of users and the decryption
time are linear with the number of receivers. Meanwhile, the
scheme [12] is only selectively secure under GDDHE assump-
tion and has no stateless property. The scheme [8] employed
(log `)-way multilinear map and also has no stateless proper-
ty. The scheme [21] employed dual system encryption tech-
nique and the private key size are linear with the number
of the total users. The public parameters size, ciphertext
size and decryption time of scheme [18] are not constant.
And it was proved adaptive CPA-security under the deci-
sional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (BDHE) assump-
tion. However, our scheme is proved adaptive CCA-security
under DBDH assumption and with stateless property.
From Table 2, the schemes [16, 34, 31] are all outside
anonymous IBBE schemes. Although the schemes [3, 23,
29, 33] are fully anonymity. But the schemes [3, 23] are
not identity-based BE schemes. The schemes [29, 33] are
only adaptively CPA-secure, and the decryption cost of the
scheme [29] is linear with the number of receivers. However,
our scheme is full anonymous scheme with adaptive CCA-
secure.
The comparison results indicate that our scheme has a
better overall performance and security.
Finally, we evaluate the performance of our anonymous
IBBE construction. All the programs were executed on a
Win7 PC with Inter(R) Core(TM) i5-3470 CPU @ 3.20GHz
processor and 4G DDR3-RAM. We use jPBC libery [11] and
JDK 1.7 to implement our construction in software. In or-
der to achieve the practical function, we choose a pairing-
friendly type-A 160-bit elliptic cure group. It’s worth point-
ing out that our running setting is the same as in [34] scheme
which only achieves outsider anonymity. The running time
of encryption and decryption about Zhang et al. scheme
[34] and ours are showed in Figure 1. In the aspect of en-
cryption, Zhang et al. scheme [34] has similar computation
efficiency with ours. However, in the aspect of decryption,
the running time of their scheme is linear with the number
of receivers. But the running time of our scheme is almost
constant, which is independent of the number of receivers.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we construct an IBBE scheme which is the
first of its kind that simultaneously achieves confidentiali-
ty and anonymity with adaptive CCA-secure under DBDH
assumption. Additionally, our scheme permits stateless re-
ceivers and supports fully collusion-resistant. In particular,
our scheme is highly efficient, and it has constant public
parameters size, private key size and decryption time. How-
ever, the ciphertext size is linear with the number of the
receivers. In our future work, we shall try to construct an
anonymous IBBE scheme with constant size ciphertext.
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Figure 1: The running time of Encryption and Decryption about Zhang et al. scheme and ours
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